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If you [electric utilities] will bring your price down to a point where
you can compel the manufacturer to shut down his private plant
because he will save money by doing so; if you can compel the street
railway to shut down its generating plant; if you can compel the city
waterworks, whether privately or publicly owned, to shut down its
power plant because of the price you quote-then you will begin to
realize the possibilities of this business, and these possibilities may
exceed your wildest dreams.
Samuel Insull, 19101
Samuel Insull's career ended in financial ruin,2 but echoes of his rally-
ing cry still resound in utility boardrooms throughout North America.
The energy landscape is marked by surpluses of electrical generating ca-
pacity and growing competition for power sales. Marketing strategy has
become one of the industry's paramount concerns.
Power system executives who worried until only a few years ago about
prospects for too much demand now fear that they may be attracting too
little. Hard won institutional expertise in managing and reducing a sys-
tem's electricity needs is widely unappreciated.
The electric company faces competition from many quarters: the gas
company, the wood purveyor, the industrial self-generator, the indepen-
dent power producer. The challenge for electric utilities is to minimize the
cost of the energy services that they provide,' while at the same time keep-
ing their shareholders happy and coping with harbingers of deregulation.
To many, the answer lies in strategies for encouraging more electricity
consumption in order to permit fuller use of the industry's generating
capacity."
But winning in the markets for energy services is not synonymous with
prodding customers to use more kilowatt-hours. Indeed, the two goals ul-
timately conflict whenever the promotional strategies preempt inexpensive
energy conservation measures and accelerate additions of costly generating
1. S. INSULL, Sell Your Product at a Price Which Will Enable You to Get a Monopoly (address
delivered Jan. 6, 1910), in CENTRAL STATION ELECTRIC SERVICE 116-17 (1915).
2. For a vivid account of Insull's fiscal misadventures and his flight to Europe, "broke and bro-
ken," at age 74, see R. MUNSON, THE POWER MAKERS 70 (1985).
3. By "energy services," I mean the heat, light, mechanical drive, and other benefits that kilowatt-
hours produce. There is, of course, no demand for electricity independent of the services that it
provides.
4. Such strategies typically focus on baseload capacity, which consists of generators that are rela-
tively inexpensive to operate, like nuclear and coal-fired power plants. When utilities can operate such
units at maximum capacity, they can spread the plants' relatively high fixed costs over the maximum
possible kilowatt-hour sales, minimizing rates to customers. In an era of low fossil fuel prices, even
gas- and oil-fired plants may become attractive potential sources of increased sales. Policies designed
to expand power consumption should be distinguished from traditional "load management" programs,
which attempt to change the timing of consumption-generally with an eye to avoiding peak peri-
ods-without affecting how much electricity is used for a particular purpose.
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capacity. The interests of shareholders and customers alike counsel a
search for alternative solutions.
That investigation begins, for the purposes of this Article, with the rec-
ognition that delivering more energy services is not synonymous with sell-
ing more energy. Opportunities abound for more efficient use of electric
power.5 In fact, electricity frequently can be conserved much more cheaply
than utilities can produce it, but potent market barriers leave much of this
potential unrealized.
Utilities have used cash payments to customers to attack these market
barriers; managers increasingly turn to efficiency investments as an alter-
native to financing new generators when additional capacity is needed. In
other words, rather than buying a new power plant, some utilities pay
customers to improve the efficiency of electricity-using buildings, appli-
ances, and industrial processes, allowing fewer kilowatt-hours to deliver
equivalent or superior services.'
Capacity surpluses, however, motivate utilities to leave such options for
another day. Emphasis shifts to policies designed to increase electricity
consumption, which reinforce constraints on conservation and may result
in irreversible losses of inexpensive efficiency options. As explained at
length below, this course is inimical to both utilities' and society's
interests.
The search for a different approach proceeds from a discussion of the
utility industry's competitive dilemma and the growing attraction of
"least-cost" principles for allocating utility investment among alternative
means of producing power and increasing the efficiency of its consump-
tion. Subsequent Parts of this Article explore the marketing advantages of
efficiency strategies, obstacles to realizing those advantages, and some of
the dangers associated with policies that promote increased electricity use.
This analysis yields a number of guidelines and incentives for responsible
power marketing, whose application is demonstrated in illustrations
drawn from recent regulatory proceedings.
I. Origins of a Competitive Dilemma
For most of this century, North American utilities have functioned as
construction companies on a gigantic scale. Each was initially awarded an
exclusive franchise to build the generating equipment and delivery systems
5. Throughout the Article, "conservation measures" and "efficiency improvements" are used in-
terchangeably to denote technologies that reduce the amount of electricity needed to deliver a given
energy service-for example, heating, cooling, lighting, and mechanical drive.
6. For descriptions of some of these investments, see infra text accompanying notes 18-20. Con-
servation investment can be as profitable to utilities as the commitment of equivalent funds to genera-
tion; see infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
Yale Journal on Regulation
needed for producing and selling electricity. Natural monopoly considera-
tions were dispositive in decisions to grant these franchises; economies of
scale were clearly evident in both the production and the distribution of
power. Profit was strictly controlled, sometimes through public ownership
of the utility itself, but more often through state regulation of privately
owned companies.7
By the late 1980s, thirty-year veterans of the North American utility
industry could identify three distinct eras in their careers. They spent the
1960s in what some now characterize as a "Golden Age," in which they
promoted power consumption and steadily expanded their generating ca-
pacity, secure in the knowledge that production costs would fall as the
inventory of power plants expanded.' By contrast, the 1970s were domi-
nated by warnings about future shortages and struggles to finish increas-
ingly costly power plants, whose owners worried that demand for
kilowatt-hours would soon outstrip supply.' Utility executives who perse-
vered into the 1980s found themselves proclaiming surpluses, cancelling
power plants, promoting electricity consumption, and battling competitors,
even as they predicted shortages in the 1990s as a consequence of their
inability to complete power plants.10
Much of this turmoil reflected technological changes that have trans-
formed the electricity business. On the generation side, reductions in the
size and construction periods of new power plants reinforced skepticism
about the mainstays of utilities' construction programs, which were giant
coal-fired and nuclear facilities requiring a decade or more to complete."
7. For a useful overview of the current regulatory system, see Joskow & Schmalensee, Incentive
Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2-8 (1986).
8. The "Golden Age" is recalled in M. Ziering, Risk, Return and Ratemaking 7-14, Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, Order Instituting Rulemaking No. 86-10-001, app. B (Oct. 1, 1986); R. MUNSON,
supra note 2, at 103-17.
9. See Cavanagh, Electrical Energy Futures, 14 ENVTL. L. 133, 136-38 (1983), and sources cited
therein.
10. The new emphasis on marketing has been widely remarked in the trade press. See, e.g., 1988:
The Big Issue is Deregulation, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Jan. 1988, at 11 (interviews with top executives
of 25 utilities); Paul, Power Plays: Electric Utilities Push New Marketing Plans to Meet Competition,
Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 6; Pollack, New Era for Electric Utilities: Residential Rates
Might Rise, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1987, at Al, col. 3; Savage, California Utility Plans to Cut Re-
bates, Push Electric Use, Energy User News, June 8, 1987, at 1; Raffaele, PP&L Proposes Electric-
ity Incentive Rates, Energy User News, Mar. 9, 1987, at 11. Data on nationwide surpluses of gener-
ating capacity appear infra at note 16. Continuing concerns about long term shortages are reviewed in
NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE UTIL. CONSUMER ADVOCATES, THERE THEY Go AGAIN: A CRITIQUE
OF THE AER/UDI REPORT ON FUTURE ELECTRICITY ADEQUACY THROUGH THE YEAR 2000
(1987).
11. See R. SANT, D. BAKKE & R. NAILL, CREATING ABUNDANCE: AMERICA'S LEAST-COST
ENERGY STRATEGY 134 (1984) ("centrally generated electricity at current prices is already uncom-
petitive in several energy service markets . . . [and] is in many cases losing to conservation technolo-
gies[, . . . cogeneration and other decentralized sources of electric generation"); OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW ELECTRIC POWER TECHNOLOGIES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR
THE 1990s 19-25 (1985) (concluding that "[a] number of developing technologies for electric power
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Rapidly changing interest rates and energy consumption trends put a pre-
mium on resource options that allowed for modular construction and flex-
ible scheduling. 2 Jurisdictions as diverse as California, Idaho, and Maine
made small scale power production an increasingly dominant part of their
energy futures. 8
At the same time, opportunities for improving the efficiency of energy
use expanded rapidly. Given the wealth of options for delivering more
services with less power, indefinite growth in electricity consumption was
no longer assured. 4
All these developments helped force the cancellation of nearly 200
utility-sponsored coal and nuclear power plants, with accompanying losses
in the tens of billions of dollars.' Many other plants were completed in
anticipation of demand that did not materialize on schedule. 6 Some legis-
generation are beginning to show considerable promise as future electric supply options," including
small scale atmospheric fluidized-bed combustion plants, wind turbines, fuel cells, and photovoltaics).
12. See, e.g., I NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND
ELECTRIC POWER PLAN 3-1 (1983) [hereinafter NORTHWEST 1983 PLAN] (emphasizing importance
in modern electricity planning of "flexible resources and conservation programs that can be modified
to meet changing demands for electricity").
13. In 1986, these states reported acquisitions of 1424 generators with an average capacity of
about 12 Megawatts. See Implementation of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1986) (testi-
mony of Logan Lanham, Senior Vice President of Public Affairs, Idaho Power Co.); id. at 114 (testi-
mony of Michael R. Peevey, Executive Vice President, Southern California Edison Co.); CENTRAL
MAINE POWER CO., COGENERATION/SMALL POWER PRODUCTION: PRE-DECREMENT THROUGH
SUBSEQUENT DECREMENT (1986).
14. See generally Hearing on Energy Security: The Role of Conservation in the National Energy
Picture: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (prepared testimony of Amory Lovins, Director of Research,
Rocky Mountain Inst.) (on file with author); id. (comments of Arthur Rosenfeld, Director, Center for
Building Science, Applied Science Div., Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory). For an industry forecast
acknowledging the possibility of long term demand reductions, see BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN.,
1986 PACIFIC NORTHWEST LOADS & RESOURCES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (1986) (projecting "low"
load growth scenario of -.30% load reductions annually for 20 years in system encompassing Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and Western Montana; "medium" and "high" annual growth projections were
1.16% and 2.69%, respectively).
15. For a review of more than $20 billion in losses to 115 abandoned nuclear power plants be-
tween 1972 and 1984, see Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and
Their Regulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 302 & n.l (1986), and sources cited therein.
Over that same period, some 75 coal-fired plants were also cancelled. WORLDWATCH INST., STATE
OF THE WORLD-1986, at 100 (1986). Analyst Charles Komanoff has released a much higher esti-
mate of net nuclear losses, including $30 billion in abandoned plant and $70 billion in life-cycle cost
overruns on completed plants. Wald, The Nuclear Industry: A Potential $100 Billion Burden, Ore-
gonian, Feb. 2, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
16. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, REGULATING IN-
DEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS: A POLICY ANALYSIS 21 n.34 (1987) (citing U.S. Department of
Energy studies indicating that "[f]or the Nation, reserve margin has been above 30% since the
mid-1970s, significantly above the historic 20% rule-of-thumb margin for adequate reserves"); R.
MUNSON, supra note 2, at 5-6 (from 1973 to 1983, utilities cancelled more than 150 plants but still
increased generating capacity by 50% over a period when demand grew by only 20%); U.S. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMIN., ANNUAL OUTLOOK FOR U.S. ELECTRIC POWER 1987 5 (from 1980 to 1985,
net U.S. generating capacity increased by 2.5% annually while annual growth rate for utility sales
was only 2.1%; coal-fired and nuclear power plants accounted for nearly all of 78,000 Megawatts of
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latures and regulators responded by insisting that future proposals for
new large scale power plants must be weighed against less costly alterna-
tives. 7 Among those alternatives were improvements in the efficiency of
electricity-consuming buildings and machines, which increasingly emerged
not only as ways for consumers to save money, but also as sources of
power for utility systems.
With savings opportunities on the order of 65% to 95% for many en-
ergy services, conservation programs became an attractive substitute for
new generators in providing the kilowatt-hours needed by new families
and businesses.1 8 Utilities in California and the Pacific Northwest were
spending almost half a billion dollars annually on such programs in the
mid-1980s, and by 1986 their regulators had established savings targets
exceeding the peak power production of eighteen 1000 Megawatt power
plants.19 A national survey in 1987 determined that "[bletween one-third
and one-half [of] the utilities in the country are now offering energy effi-
ciency rebate programs," which provided ratepayer-funded cash rewards
for customers who made efforts to save electricity.2"
The regulatory community also increasingly recognized that, in the
words of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, "it is important to
new capacity). New England is a prominent exception to generalizations about capacity surpluses.
See, e.g., Tye, Energy Crunch Highlighted Need for Conservation Plans, Boston Globe, Jan. 16,
1988, at 1, col. 2.
17. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 476A.6.5 (West 1946 & Supp. 1987); Wellinghoff & Mitchell,
A Model for Statewide Integrated Utility Resource Planning, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 8, 1985, at 19,
24-26 (describing Nevada's regulations); 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e) (1982) (requiring Northwest power
planners to assign cost-effective conservation priority over new power plants); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
480-100-251(2) (1987) (utilities must identify "the mix of generating resources and improvements in
the efficient use of electricity that will meet current and future needs at the lowest cost to the utility
and its ratepayers.").
18. Potential savings are reviewed in, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 312-14; ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN INST., COMPETITEK: ADVANCED TECHNIQUES FOR ELECTRIC EFFICIENCY (1987) (identifying
potential savings for lighting, water heat, space cooling, and appliances of 82-96%, 65-85%, 80-90%,
and 65-85%, respectively). At least one federal statute explicitly accords conservation equal status
with new power plants as a "resource" for electric power planning purposes. See Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839a(19) (1982).
19. California's eight investor-owned utilities spent almost $1 billion on conservation programs
between 1984 and 1986. EVALUATION & COMPLIANCE Div., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, ENERGY
CONSERVATION PROGRAM SUMMARIES (1984, 1985, 1986). By 2005, savings from programs already
adopted in California are expected to reach 12,858 Megawatts. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMM'N, CON-
SERVATION REPORT lI-I1 (1986). The Northwest Power Planning Council estimates that utilities in
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington invested between $800 and $900 million on conservation
resources between 1981 and mid-1987. I NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, A REVIEW OF
CONSERVATION COSTS AND BENEFITS 2 (1987). The Council has identified ten programs that are
expected to save 3900 average Megawatts-the equivalent of 5300 peak Megawatts operating at 70%
capacity-if load growth is at the high end of the range deemed plausible over the next two decades. 1
NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC POWER
PLAN 8-3 (1986) [hereinafter NORTHWEST 1986 PLAN].
20. Study Finds Increasing Use of Rebate Programs as Utilities Seek Alternatives to Generation,
ENERGY CONSERVATION DIG., Jan. 4, 1988, at 1 (summarizing survey published by Electric Power
Research Inst.).
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treat direct utility investment in conservation in a manner similar to other
utility assets."'" To the Wisconsin Commission and several of its counter-
parts, this meant that utilities should be permitted to earn a profit on
prudent conservation expenditures.2 If conservation was to compete on
equal terms with power generation for utilities' investment dollars, utili-
ties' shareholders needed an opportunity to earn a fair return in the
process.
Such a competition implies a practicable means of comparing the life-
cycle costs of conservation and generation options. A "least-cost planning"
label is frequently applied to a cluster of methods for performing these
comparisons and integrating the results into resource acquisition sched-
ules. By 1987, utilities and regulators in thirty-seven states were embark-
ing on efforts to minimize the long term costs of reliable electricity service,
to credit comparative advantages of scale and lead time when evaluating
candidates for utility investment, and to defer new generators until utili-
ties had explored less expensive conservation opportunities.2 The plan-
ner's challenge was no longer to fit large generators to a forecast of inexo-
rably growing demand, but rather to develop more flexible resource
portfolios and manage power needs instead of simply trying to predict
them. Initial results were dramatic; the nation's first officially adopted
least-cost plan indefinitely deferred all new large scale generators in a
region that earlier had launched one of the world's most ambitious nu-
clear power plant construction programs.2 4
21. See E. HIRST, REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN-
NING 13-15 (Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory 1988) (discussing Commission orders and practices in
Washington and Nevada in addition to Wisconsin). Another perceptive treatment of conservation fi-
nance issues is Counihan, Adding Conservation to the Rate Base, GOVERNANCE: HARV. J. PUB.
POL'Y, Summer-Fall 1986, at 55.
22. The profit is awarded by adding such investments to a utility's rate base, from which returns
to shareholders are calculated. Wisconsin and Washington State have taken the further step of award-
ing a higher rate of return for utilities' conservation investments. See Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Opinion and Order No. 6630-UR-100 (Dec. 30, 1986) ("performance incentive of 1% additional
return on capitalized conservation expenditures for each 125 Megawatts of load that is saved at a cost
of less than $200 per kilowatt plus 2 cents per kilowatt-hour"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.28.025
(West 1962 & Supp. 1988) (eligibility of conservation investments for two percentage point addition
to otherwise applicable rate of return).
23. These methods are described in greater detail in Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 322-24,
330-42; 1 NORTHWEST 1986 PLAN, supra note 19, at 3-1 to 3-7; Wellinghoff & Mitchell, supra
note 17, at 19-20. According to a recent Energy Conservation Coalition study, "37 states have under-
taken 61 different actions-either through legislation, regulation or studies-to explore and/or pro-
mote least-cost electrical planning ...over the 18 month period from January 1986 to June 1987."
ENERGY CONSERVATION COALITION, A BRIGHTER FUTURE: STATE ACTIONS IN LEAST-COST
ELECTRICAL PLANNING 1 (1987). Within that group, "twenty-three state regulatory commissions
were engaged in either examining or initiating least-cost planning," "twelve state legislatures intro-
duced and/or passed least-cost planning bills and resolutions," and "six states released studies which
recommend that utilities prepare least-cost resource plans to be submitted to the appropriate state
regulatory agency." Id.
24. The plan was developed by the Northwest Power Planning Council for Idaho, Montana,
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Least-cost planning was introduced at a time of institutional and legal
upheaval. In the decade following passage of the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),2 5 federal and state regulators invited
a host of independent producers to challenge utilities' monopoly over
power production. 6 High construction costs for utilities' own generators
created pressure for rate increases, which were particularly untimely in
light of OPEC's inability to sustain high prices for competing fuels. Many
electricity customers threatened to replace the local utility as their supplier
of energy services by turning instead to self-generation, other power pro-
ducers, or substitute fuels.2"
Utilities have responded to these competitive pressures by trying to con-
vince customers to use more of their product. One strategy involves so-
called "declining block rates," which reward increased use with progres-
sively lower charges per kilowatt-hour consumed.28 Alternatively, custom-
ers may simply be offered discounts from current rate schedules. 9 Multi-
Oregon, and Washington. See Cavanagh, supra note 9, at 133-41 & 148. Compare 1 NORTHWEST
1983 PLAN, supra note 12, at 5-13 (concluding that Pacific Northwest did not need to add new
thermal power plants until 1998 at the earliest) with PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES CONFERENCE
COMM., WEST GROUP FORECAST OF POWER LOADS AND RESOURCES FOR JULY 1980-JUNE 1991
1-15 (1980) (utilities' forecast for same region includes warning of 100% probability of prolonged
electricity rationing by 1988).
25. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16
U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., & 40 U.S.C.).
26. Under PURPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has assured private investors in
specified generating technologies a right to sell electricity to their local utilities at whatever price those
utilities would have had to pay to generate an equivalent amount of electricity themselves. See 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2)-(b)(4) (1987). Among the results are the numer-
ous small scale generators cited supra at note 13. Recent trends in PURPA implementation have
included an emphasis on auctions in which independent power producers bid against each other for
contracts to supply specified amounts of power to utilities. See, e.g., M. ROTHKOPF, E. KAHN, T.
TEISBERG, J. ETO & J. NATAF, DESIGNING PURPA POWER PURCHASE AUCTIONS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 1987).
27. See, e.g., 1988: The Big Issue is Deregulation, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Jan. 1988, at 11-20
(potential customer loss problems cited by executives of Pacific Power & Light (Oregon), Pennsylva-
nia Power & Light, Southern California Edison, Pacific Gas & Electric (California), Southern Com-
pany Services (Georgia), Arizona Public Service Co., and Northeast Utilities Service Co.); see also
CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMM'N, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SELF-GENERATION (1987). Such pres-
sures were felt even in capacity-constrained New England. See Conn. DPUC Stresses Conservation,
Reliability for Discouraging Bypass, COGENERATION REP., Feb. 26, 1988, at 4 (Connecticut Light &
Power "estimates that about 740 Megawatts-roughly 15% to 20% of its projected load-could be lost
to competition by 1992"); Koch, Twenty-five NH Firms Ask Electric Rate Reductions, Portsmouth
Herald, Dec. 30, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
28. This can be achieved either by charging a lower rate for kilowatt-hours consumed above a
certain threshold or by combining high service charges with a flat rate structure.
29. Regulators, who normally frown on price adjustments of this kind, are sometimes persuaded
that they advance other ratepayers' interests without constituting "undue discrimination." As long as
the lower rates include some contribution to meeting the system's fixed costs, other utility customers
receive near term rate benefits. See, e.g., ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMM'N, ISSUE PAPER: THE IMPACT
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/INCENTIVE UTILITY RATES ON ILLINOIS BUSINESSES-WITH SPE-
CIAL EMPHASIS ON THE SMALL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 13 (1987); Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order
No. 87-402, at 10 (Mar. 31, 1987) (rate discounts "must ... benefit other customers by maximizing
contribution to fixed costs from customers receiving the discount"),
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year contracts may be involved, along with pledges by customers not to
install their own generating equipment.3 0
But such strategies are not the most effective ways to capture and hold
energy service markets, and they carry both economic and environmental
risks. The following discussion responds to arguments for promotional
policies and urges a realignment of some misplaced regulatory incentives
that impel utilities to act against their stockholders' and customers' best
interests.
II. Reconciling Energy Conservation and Capacity Surpluses
Many utility executives and academics frame the industry's current di-
lemma in roughly the following illustrative terms: consider a company
selling power at eight cents per kilowatt-hour (reflecting average system
costs), while one of its coal-fired power plants is running well below ca-
pacity despite operating costs of only about two cents per kilowatt-hour
(the much higher fixed costs are sunk).,1 Surely free market logic calls for
efforts to place that plant at the service of new sources of electricity con-
sumption by offering rates per kilowatt-hour that are much closer to two
cents than eight cents. The utility's profits will increase, the argument
goes, other customers will get rate relief, and society will realize greater
economic efficiency in the consumption of electricity services.3 2
On the other hand, if the utility does not change its pricing policies, it
risks eliciting excessive consumer investment in energy-saving technologies
since rates are providing false signals about the cost of serving additional
consumption. For the company to go further and invest scarce capital in
conservation programs would exacerbate the problem, to the particular
disadvantage of customers who did not participate in the programs.
These inferences are appealing, plausible, and wrong. They reflect un-
realistic views of how energy markets function, and they overlook the most
promising strategies for improving utilities' and consumers' fiscal welfare.
30. See, e.g., Supplemental Agreement Between Pacific Power & Light Co. and Boise Cascade
Corporation, Oct. 31, 1986 (Late-Filed Exhibit No. 2, Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n No. 86.12.76) (ten-
year rate discount conditioned on recipient's pledge to forego construction of on-site generating facili-
ties); BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., A FINAL REPORT ON THE BONNEVILLE PARTNERSHIP 9 (1987)
(describing seven-year "rate stability" contracts); Western Area Power Admin., Economic Develop-
ment, CONSERVATION & RENEWABLE ENERGY BULL. 6, 7 (1986) (North Dakota utility offers rate
discounts "guaranteed for ten years, giving large electrical users time to plan").
31. North America's extensive power surpluses are discussed supra at note 16.
32. Economist Jim Lazar has argued persuasively that such analyses grossly understate the true
operating costs of coal-fired units, including but not limited to environmental impacts and costs associ-
ated with wear and tear on equipment that has a limited lifetime and steadily escalating replacement
costs. See J. Lazar, Should Utility Conservation Efforts Continue During a Surplus? 13 (May 3,
1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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To see why, it is important first to review some basic principles of elec-
tricity regulation.
A. Decoupling Utility Profits from Sales Volumes
Profits from electricity sales are supposed to reflect regulators' decisions
about appropriate returns on prudently invested capital. The regulatory
commission determines how much revenue the utility needs in order to
earn this return and recoup its operating expenses, and divides this
amount by projected sales. The result is the rate per kilowatt-hour that is
used to calculate an electric bill. The exercise captured in this oversimpli-
fied description is repeated intermittently to accommodate changing costs
and circumstances.
Actual returns on utilities' investments may differ from the sums au-
thorized in the rate-setting process. Among other things, the regulators'
assumptions about electricity sales become crucial here; if sales drop below
the forecast, both gross and net revenues will lag also. Conversely, if sales
can be stimulated beyond the regulators' expectations, the shareholders
will receive a windfall. The regulators could respond by cutting rates of
return at some future date, but that would simply set in motion a fresh
cycle of opportunities to increase net earnings by beating the forecast
under the new rates.
If the costs of serving additional consumption exceeded rates per
kilowatt-hour, of course, incentives would change and utilities would
profit by restraining demand. But this would require rapid escalation of
fossil fuel prices or total exhaustion of capacity surpluses on both a util-
ity's own system and those of its neighbors. Otherwise, the immediate cost
of procuring an additional kilowatt-hour will generally fall well below the
rates at which utilities are permitted to sell it.3"
Under conventional rate-of-return regulation, then, short term profit
considerations almost uniformly favor increased sales of kilowatt-hours.
The relationship is strengthened further when utilities have substantial
surpluses of generating capacity that is relatively inexpensive to operate.
These incentives explain, at least in part, utilities' periodic campaigns to
market power and spur consumption.
But this reward structure is not inviolable. California's experience dem-
onstrates how readily returns to shareholders can be decoupled from elec-
tricity sales. The California Public Utilities Commission has developed a
mechanism called the Electric Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (ERAM),
33. Rates must recover both capital and operating costs, whereas incremental production incurs
few, if any, new capital costs.
Vol. 5: 331, 1988
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through which "[rievenue differences resulting from the differences be-
tween forecast and actual sales are recorded in a balancing account and
are periodically recovered from or returned to customers." 4 As a result,
"changes in sales volumes do not affect earnings." 5 Customers' rates are
adjusted periodically to bring actual profits into balance with the initial
regulatory decision.
It is important to emphasize that ERAM does not interfere with utili-
ties' incentives to reduce expenses; benefits to shareholders from cost-
cutting innovations are unaffected by ERAM adjustments. 6 What is re-
moved is "the effect on earnings of sales variations resulting from conser-
vation or weather conditions, for example." ' On a year-by-year basis,
such unanticipated variations may account for as much as six percent of
total sales and can reduce or increase profits by substantial amounts. 8
The ERAM device does not guarantee utilities a fixed profit regardless
of management's competence. The only new assurance to managers is that
profits will not be affected by kilowatt-hour sales, a variable that bears no
obvious relationship to successful delivery of cost-effective energy services.
After all, "[u]tility customers do not seek [kilowatt-hours] and [kilowatts];
rather, they purchase warmth, hot water, motor power, and other basic
services."3" Technological advances in end use efficiencies have demon-
strated repeatedly that quality of service is independent of the number of
kilowatt-hours and kilowatts consumed for any particular purpose.'
34. Rulemaking Proceeding to Revise Electric Utility Ratemaking Mechanisms, Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Decision No. 87-02-030, at 2 (Feb. 11, 1987). The California PUC has tentatively decided
to suspend this regime for large industrial customers, while leaving it undisturbed in the residential
and commercial sectors.
[The Electric Revenue Adjustment Mechanism] allow[s] the utilities to pursue conservation,
load management, and social programs required by the Commission without working directly
against the utilities' own interests. Any losses in sales or revenues resulting from such pro-
grams would be recovered . . . . Since we are retaining ERAM for the commercial and resi-
dential classes, the utilities' incentives to pursue effective conservation opportunities in these
classes is unchanged.
Rulemaking Proceeding to Revise Electric Utility Ratemaking Mechanisms, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
Decision No. 87-05-071, at 9 (May 29, 1987).
The decision to suspend ERAM for the large industrial class reflected the Commission's finding
that utilities needed additional inducements to preempt such customers' on-site generation, which was
placing upward pressure on other customers' rates. Id. at 8. Subsequently, the Commission deter-
mined that utilities should offer conservation payments as an alternative to rate discounts in discour-
aging uneconomic on-site generation. See infra note 92.
35. M. Ziering, supra note 8, at 79. This represents a specialized application of a familiar regu-
latory device, the automatic adjustment provision. See Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 7, at 4.
36. M. Ziering, supra note 8, at 87.
37. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Decision No. 87-02-030, supra note 34, at 2.
38. See id. at 8. For Southern California Edison, which serves the Los Angeles area, a 6% sales
variation would "equate to a variation of 250 basis points in return on equity." Id.
39. Chamberlin, Hanser & Smith, Developing An Integrated Value-Based Planning Process,
STRATEGIC NOTES, Fall 1987, at 3. For an elegant elaboration on the same theme a decade earlier,
see A. LovINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE 38-46 (1977).
40. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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Why, then, should society or its regulators want utilities' profits to vary
with fluctuations in sales of kilowatt-hours and kilowatts?
The next two sections investigate whether social or at least ratepayer
benefits may result from rewarding utilities for stimulating electricity con-
sumption. Clearly, however, there need be no inherent relationship be-
tween higher electricity sales and higher utility profits, even when sub-
stantial generating capacity is idle. Regulators should make a conscious
and informed decision about whether to create such a linkage, rather than
letting the result emerge by default.
B. Minimizing Society's Electricity Costs
In the illustration that began this Part, a utility was selling power at
rates well above the cost of additional production at its generators. A fail-
ure to reduce such rates may appear to create excessive inducements to
conserve power, since electricity supplies could be expanded at a modest
fraction of the price at which they are being sold.
But high electricity rates do not elicit commensurate conservation in-
vestments. "[Tihe best available evidence indicates that efficiency does not
sell unless it produces real annual returns, in reduced energy costs, on the
order of 30-200 percent; this is equivalent to a payback requirement of
six months to three years." '41 Such findings have been reported for all
major categories of electricity consumption, including those in the com-
mercial and industrial sectors.4 By contrast, utilities typically earn less
than fifteen percent on invested capital, and a new large scale coal or
nuclear power plant cannot even begin generating a marketable product
until the conclusion of a ten-to-sixteen year siting and construction
period. 8
41. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 318 (citing sources); see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY
SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 107 (1987) ("Consumers typi-
cally look for short payback periods-6 months to 2 years-for energy-conserving investments. Yet
many such investments will produce energy savings for years, as in the case of an efficient furnace
with a useful life of 20 years."); 2 NORTHWEST 1986 PLAN, supra note 19, at 4-6 to 4-10 (review of
discount rates applied by consumers to conservation investments).
42. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 318 n.57 (citing sources); ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY,
INDUSTRIAL DECISION-MAKING INTERVIEWS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20 (Jan. 1987)
(prepared for Mich. Electricity Options Study) (large industrial customers require conservation in-
vestments to repay their costs in two to three years; "[ulnder tight conditions projects may be funded
only if they have a payback of one year or less"); ENERGY BRANCH, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, 1984
ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM SUMMARY 6 (1985) (utilities' "energy auditors have found that
their [commercial and industrial sector] customers are reluctant to invest in hardware conservation
measures unless the energy savings produce a 100% return within less than two years, and in many
cases within six months").
43. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL HEALTH OF THE ELEC-
TRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 10-13 (1984) (historical overview of electric utility industry's rates of re-
turn); NORTHWEST 1986 PLAN, supra note 19, at 7-11 (120-month siting and construction period for
600 megawatt "generic coal" units); 14 BATTELLE PAC. NORTHWEST LABORATORIES, ASSESSMENT
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The disparity in investment criteria for conservation and generation
suggests that widely differing discount rates are used in decisions about
building generators and buying conservation." Buyers of conservation in
the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors apply high discount
rates to saved kilowatt-hours, while utilities evaluate future kilowatt-
hours from new generators more favorably. Strong elements of rationality
underpin the behavior of both groups, but the gap invites low-return in-
vestments in power plants that cost-effective conservation could displace."5
When those investments are made, everyone loses.
Moreover, customers who insist on rapid paybacks from long-lived effi-
ciency measures are imposing a cost limit per conserved kilowatt-hour
that falls far below applicable retail electric rates. Most conservation ex-
penses are incurred up-front, while the savings are spread over a period of
years or decades. Typical discount rates for conservation imply that costs
must be amortized over the initial year or two of savings. Based on find-
ings by the Northwest Power Planning Council, for example, it appears
that the average consumer would decline or ignore appliance efficiency
measures with twenty-year lifetimes costing less than one cent per
kilowatt-hour saved, even if that consumer's electricity rate were as high
as eight cents per kilowatt-hour.' Comparable conclusions apply to long-
lived industrial measures.47
As a result, inexpensive conservation opportunities will pervade utility
systems whose rates far exceed the conservation's cost per kilowatt-hour.
Extracting kilowatt-hours from many of these untapped sources is cheaper
than operating a typical baseload power plant. 8 Those who see benefits to
OF ELECTRIC POWER CONSERVATION AND SUPPLY RESOURCES IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: Nu-
CLEAR 3.19 (1983) (16-year average lead-time from preliminary planning to start-up for contempo-
rary U.S. light water reactors).
44. In addition to sources cited supra notes 41-43, see B. Reddy, Least-Cost Planning for Electric
Utilities 32-33 (Dec. 22, 1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
45. See, e.g., L. Ruff, The Basic Economics of Utility Least-Cost Planning and Demand-Side
Management 58 (Oct. 1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (characterizing industries'
stringent payback requirements as "a rule-of-thumb method for capturing other constraints, costs and
risks"); Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 319 ("[dlecisions about end use efficiencies often are made by
developers and landlords who will not be paying the ensuing utility bills"). For their part, utilities are
generally allowed a fixed rate of return on "prudent" investment regardless of its nature; as explained
in this section, the utilities' rate of return falls well below consumers' implicit discount rates for
conservation.
46. Hearings before the Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Pac. Power & Light Co. sched. 5, at 1 (No.
86.12.76) (Feb. 25, 1987) (rate decrease proc.) (testimony of Ralph Cavanagh). The assumed cus-
tomer discount rate is 65% real, in line with empirical findings reported supra at note 41. This
discount rate effectively requires recovery of the conservation's costs in less than two years. If rates are
8 cents per kilowatt-hour, 20-year savings with life-cycle costs of even 1 cent per kilowatt-hour will
not pass muster, because their payback period exceeds the specified interval.
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 18 (savings costing 0.2 cents per kilowatt-
hour or less for lighting, water heating, and space cooling); 2 NORTHWEST 1986 PLAN, supra note
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society in increased consumption of kilowatt-hours from surplus generat-
ing capacity should also inquire whether utilities could effect an
equivalent expansion of energy services at lower cost by purchasing im-
provements in end use efficiencies.49
For example, the least expensive ways to increase factory output or
space cooling services may involve improving industrial processes or air
conditioners rather than running power plants. Such possibilities are not
foreclosed by either the existence of idle generating capacity or a substan-
tial disparity between retail electricity rates and the generators' operating
costs.
C. Addressing Distributional Concerns
Critics of conservation investment by utilities worry particularly about
rate impacts on nonparticipating customers.50 If utilities with capacity
surpluses invest in conservation, rates per kilowatt-hour ultimately will
have to rise; fixed costs must be recovered over smaller unit sales. Those
who did not enroll in the conservation programs would then face higher
bills. Even conservation programs costing utilities nothing would have this
impact whenever a utility's rates were higher than its marginal operating
costs; the lost revenues from reduced power sales would exceed the savings
from reduced operating costs.8 ' Even though system-wide electricity costs
would drop substantially, bills would increase for ratepayers with stable
or growing demand.
Of course, the same concerns are, or ought to be, raised by the rate
discounts that many utilities are introducing in an effort to secure compet-
19, at 5-29 (identifying five major water heat conservation measures that produce savings for less than
1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour).
49. Market barriers to conservation sometimes elicit the response that remedial measures should
come from government, not utilities. If cost-effective appliance or building efficiency opportunities are
languishing, governments should respond with mandatory standards. Without disputing the merits of
such standards, which have proved considerable, their reach is inevitably incomplete. Some electricity
uses do not lend themselves to efficiency regulation, while others can be reached only in the teeth of
potent anti-regulatory interests. Utilities that try to make market barriers exclusively the regulator's
problem risk paying unnecessarily for power plants that could have been displaced more cheaply with
conservation investments. Cf Cavanagh, supra note 9, at 169-71 (reviewing ways that utilities can
improve prospects for and success of efficiency regulations).
50. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER IN AMERICA: Eco-
NOMIC SUPPLY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 5-48 (1983) ("When non-participants subsidize efficiency
measures taken by participating ratepayers and face increased electric rates as a result, the concern
about wealth transfers is heightened.").
51. For example, if rates were 5 cents per kilowatt-hour and operating costs were 4 cents per
kilowatt-hour, every kilowatt-hour saved by a conservation program would avoid 4 cents in costs but
would also deprive the utility of 5 cents in revenues. The losses in net revenues would have to be
recouped from those who did not participate in the program, unless participants made compensatory
payments to the utility. Provided, however, that the savings cost less than 4 cents per kilowatt-hour
(the utility's operating costs), the system-wide electricity bill would decline.
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itive advantages. Rate discounts have the same immediate effect on non-
participants as conservation payments; the discounts typically are justified
on the ground that nonparticipants would be still worse off if the recipi-
ents withheld or reduced their purchases. Yet that same rationale argues
at least as strongly for conservation payments. Customers who invest in
efficiency improvements, with their utilities' help, are likely to prove more
reliable revenue sources than customers who secure comparable reductions
in energy bills through rate discounts. As a utility customer lowers its
energy needs, it becomes a less tempting target for the utility's
competitors. 2
Other aspects of the debate over nonparticipant equity and conservation
will not be explored at length here. I have argued elsewhere that if utility-
financed incentives to install cost-effective efficiency improvements are
substantial, and if marketing efforts focus on traditional nonparticipants,
utilities can buy energy savings without disadvantaging any class of
customers. 5
It remains troubling, moreover, that those who challenge conservation
on distributional grounds seldom apply the same criteria to power plant
investment. This selective approach has been justified on the ground that
all ratepayers are "participants" in the electricity demand that necessitates
power plant construction, so that all should share in the resulting costs.54
But customers differ significantly in their ability to avoid those costs,
and here the market barriers to conservation take on a new and harsh
significance. Access to the capital and knowledge needed to improve build-
ing and equipment efficiencies or to switch fuels is hardly independent of
wealth. For the indigent, the options for escaping new power plant costs
typically involve increasingly painful ways to do without energy services.
Analogous complaints can be raised by those who depend on fixed
electricity-intensive equipment for their livelihoods or their comfort. Such
52. These competitors have the most to gain by courting relatively inefficient electricity consum-
ers, who can be expected to purchase relatively high volumes of the competitors' fuels. By the same
token, such consumers have the most compelling incentives to acquire and exploit fuel-switching capa-
bilities in an increasingly competitive market. Cf supra notes 10 & 27. Highly efficient electricity
users have much less to gain by turning to other energy suppliers when rates change.
53. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 325-27. For an example of a county-wide project that met and
exceeded these distributional objectives, see E. HIRST, THE HOOD RIVER CONSERVATION PROJECT:
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ix (1987) (utility-financed program insulated most of Oregon county's
3500 electrically-heated dwellings, including rental and low income units, and "[njonparticipants had
higher incomes and newer homes than did participants."). Participation in the Hood River project
involved the inconvenience and household disruption attending replacement of windows and extensive
insulation of floors, attics, and walls. In the residential conservation sector, it is difficult to conceive of
measures creating a greater marketing challenge.
54. B. Reddy, supra note 44, app. at 7.
Yale Journal on Regulation
ratepayers are at a relative disadvantage in the system-wide competition to
avoid higher power bills associated with additional generators.56
There is no principled basis for distinguishing these issues from the
distributional concerns raised by critics of utilities' conservation invest-
ments. Neither power plant nor conservation investments are invulnerable
to claims of inequity; both may add to society's energy bill, and some
individuals will be more successful than others at escaping the ensuing
pain. Cost-effective conservation programs have the advantage of inflicting
less pain in aggregate,6" and utilities' conservation payments reach a
broader cross section of society than do payments for the construction and
operation of power plants."7 From 1984 to 1986, for example, California
utilities financed conservation measures in more than 63,000 businesses
and 1.5 million households; almost one-fifth of the households were classi-
fied as "low income." 8 So too, as Part III will explain, all ratepayers
"participate" in important system-wide benefits of conservation, regardless
of their involvement with individual measures.
III. Dangers of Promotional Policies
Although shareholders and ratepayers alike can profit from utilities'
conservation investments, even when rates substantially exceed the operat-
ing costs of underutilized power plants, it is nonetheless clear that many
North American utilities with surplus capacity have reached quite differ-
ent conclusions. Moreover, few if any regulators have followed Califor-
nia's lead in breaking the linkage between near term profits and kilowatt-
hour sales. There are several urgent reasons to change this course.
55. 1 am indebted for this insight to Thomas Foley of the Northwest Power Planning Council.
56. The term "cost-effective" is used in the least-cost planning sense to refer to savings that cost
the utility system less than an equivalent amount of generation.
57. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSER-
VATION 2 (1984) ("The literature generally concludes that expenditures on conservation generate
more regional employment opportunities than expenditures of the same size on power plant construc-
tion and operation.").
58. See EVALUATION & COMPLIANCE Div., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, 1986 ENERGY CONSER-
VATION PROGRAM SUMMARY 13-14, 19-20; 1985 ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM SUMMARY
10, 13; 1984 ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM SUMMARY 2, 6. Utilities offered loans and rebates
to defray part of the cost of insulating homes; low income customers received efficiency measures at no
charge. Commercial customers could obtain rebates for "installing hardware which improved end-use
efficiency in lighting, [heating, ventilation, air conditioning], electric motor and refrigeration applica-
tions." 1986 SUMMARY at 19. The totals reported in text exclude part of a group of 213,000 residen-
tial customers who received incentives to improve appliance efficiencies but did not participate in
insulation programs. See 1986 SUMMARY at 15; 1985 SUMMARY at 10; 1984 SUMMARY at 3.
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A. Lost Conservation Opportunities
Many decisions about energy efficiency are essentially irreversible over
the lifetime of the building or machine to which they apply. 9 The differ-
ence between average and high efficiencies is a block of generation that
constitutes an electric power resource. The Northwest Power Planning
Council, chartered by Congress with regional least-cost planning responsi-
bilities, has coined the term "lost-opportunity resource" to identify
cost-effective resources that would lose their cost-effectiveness if not
developed or maintained now or in the near term. Consequently,
their savings could be lost forever . . . . A primary example of such
a lost-opportunity resource is the energy efficiency of new buildings.
Since many energy-saving measures cannot be installed cost-
effectively later, buildings constructed without these measures will
continue consuming energy inefficiently long after the surplus [of
generating capacity] is over.80
Other examples involve long-lived appliances, furnaces, and industrial
processes. In setting priorities for conservation investment, utilities should
distinguish between irreversible decisions with consequences stretching be-
yond projected capacity surpluses, and short term or deferrable actions.
The latter category includes installation of measures such as water heater
wraps and light bulb replacements, whose potential savings are not pre-
empted by delay."'
Promotional policies lead to lost conservation opportunities in two
ways. The most visible is the reduced economic reward for efficiency that
results from the new rates and rate structures; when consumption becomes
cheaper at the margin, conservation becomes correspondingly less attrac-
tive to the consumer." At least equally important is the increased uncer-
tainty about long term returns from conservation investment that such
policies introduce. Under fluctuating rate structures, it is very difficult for
customers to predict whether and how soon their efficiency investments
59. New houses have an average lifetime of at least 70 years; even mobile homes can be expected
to last more than 40 years. See 2 NORTHWEST 1986 PLAN, supra note 19, at 5-14. For the industrial
sector, by way of illustration, none of the Pacific Northwest's 3000 Megawatts of aluminum manufac-
turing demand was less than 17 years old in 1988, and nearly one-third of it was more than 45 years
old. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, CHOOSING AN ELECTRICAL ENERGY FUTURE FOR
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO 82 (1977).
60. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, A REVIEW OF CONSERVATION COSTS AND BEN-
EFITS: FIVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE UNDER THE NORTHWEST POWER ACT 2 (1987).
61. For utilities in immediate need of energy or capacity, of course, measures in both categories
will be attractive if the savings cost less than other supply options.
62. The impact of the shift in price signals is muted to a considerable extent, of course, by the
numerous market barriers reviewed supra at text accompanying notes 41-49.
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will be profitable. The uncertainty provides effective reinforcement of the
fast payback constraint described above.
In all of these respects, promotional policies generally do not discrimi-
nate between reversible and irreversible consumption decisions.6" Even if
such policies are sharply limited in duration, they can influence decisions
that will reverberate far beyond the policies' termination date. By increas-
ing the market barriers to "lost-opportunity" efficiency investment, "tem-
porary" rate discounts threaten to create long term consequences that will
outlast predicted surpluses. Absent some compensatory strategy, cost-
effective conservation resources will disappear.
B. Increased Volatility of Revenues and Demand
Modern utility planners are properly troubled by uncertainty about fu-
ture power sales and revenues. They are all too familiar with jests about
how difficult it is to predict anything, particularly the future. Power plant
investments are committed up to a decade in advance of predicted need,
and the costs of error in anticipating energy demand have frequently run
into the billions of dollars."'
Enter promotional policies, targeted at the system's most price-respon-
sive consumption and designed to recruit growth that would not occur at
rates reflecting system average costs, let alone the higher costs of new ca-
pacity.65 Such rates will reduce rewards for efficiency investments in the
machines and buildings that produce the additional consumption. The re-
sult is greater uncertainty about future revenues and resource needs,
which imposes costs that are unlikely to appear in analyses supporting the
promotional policies.
These costs could be avoided if utilities were able to assume that any
loads they recruited would not outlive the term of marketing programs.
Given their legal obligations to serve all applicants, however, utilities can-
not simply ignore the possible permanence of load growth associated with
promotional programs."' Accordingly, successful programs can be ex-
pected to affect resource planning and investment, diverting more dollars
into new long term power supply. 7 Program sponsors then become vul-
nerable to recurrences of their worst nightmare: customers are lured into
63. But see infra Appendix A for one solution to this problem.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
65. Utility rates reflect an average of costs for all generating resources on the system. Costs of new
generating resources typically exceed that average substantially. As a result, electricity consumption
that is uneconomical under current rates would be even less economical under rates that reflected the
cost of replacing or supplementing existing capacity.
66. See A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION 227-38 (1969).
67. Section IV.A infra proposes a way of avoiding these impacts on the resource planning process.
Vol. 5: 331, 1988
Responsible Power Marketing
heavy use by promotional rates, only to cut back or depart just as the bill
comes due for the costly new resources built in anticipation of sustained
heavy use. With influential institutions already calling for new generating
capacity to meet needs extrapolated from recent demand increases, this
prospect is neither distant nor speculative.68
On the other hand, one of the strongest justifications for sustaining con-
servation programs during surplus periods is their contribution to reduc-
ing uncertainty about future system needs. As the California Public Utili-
ties Commission and Energy Commission recently determined in a joint
report:
[U]ncertainty can be lessened through increasing energy efficiency
. . . [T]he uncertainty introduced by uncertain economic growth
projections-such as amount of commercial floor space-can be re-
duced by lowering per unit consumption by using more efficient ap-
pliances and designing more efficient buildings. . . . [Regulators]
should consider this when developing building and appliance stan-
dards and setting utility funding for demand-side management
programs. 69
A recent University of Southern California study evaluated these bene-
fits for the Bonneville Power Administration's system and concluded that
widespread improvements in the efficiency of new buildings offer the pros-
pect, over the next two decades, of "24% less uncertainty" about loads and
"a 22% reduction in rate uncertainty." 0 To the extent that capacity sur-
pluses lead utilities to abandon or defer conservation programs, the loss of
such contributions exacerbates the uncertainty problems described above.
C. Lost Marketing Opportunities
If there is a case for making fuller use of a system's generating capacity,
it does not necessarily follow that the best uses will be homegrown. When
utilities decide to subsidize electric water heaters or to sign multi-year
68. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
136-41 (1987) (contending, at 139, that "[uinder cautious assumptions ... in the year 2000 the
Nation will need approximately 100 gigawatts of new electric generating capacity (beyond plants now
under construction) to maintain adequate electricity supplies"); Hines, Two Studies Predict Serious
Electricity Shortages by Year 2000, ENERGY USER NEWS, Aug. 31, 1987, at 13.
69. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMM'N, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE
ON JOINT CEC/CPUC HEARINGS ON ExCESS GENERATING CAPACITY 11-7 to 11-8 (1987).
"Demand-side management programs" refers to utility efforts to influence customers' power use, in-
cluding the energy conservation initiatives described supra at text accompanying notes 18-20.
70. A. FORD & J. GEINZER, THE IMPACT OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON THE UNCER-
TAINTY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC SYSTEM 18, 21 (1988) (prepared for Bonneville
Power Admin.).
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industrial discount contracts, they may be overlooking competing opportu-
nities for multi-year export transactions in wholesale power markets.
These markets have absorbed an increasing proportion of power sales
in recent years. Indeed, transfers between utilities grew three times faster
than total electricity production between 1945 and 1980, and accounted
for about thirty percent of all power sales by 1987."' But interutility
transmission systems are dominated by spot market transactions of rela-
tively low value. Capacity surpluses offer the option of supplementing or
replacing some of those transactions with longer term commitments, which
return greater rewards to buyer and seller alike. Conversely, kilowatt-
hours and kilowatts absorbed by a promotional program are unavailable
for wholesale transfers.
Regulators and utilities alike should scrutinize this tradeoff more
closely, particularly since promotional programs are often justified on the
basis of anticipated benefits for other ratepayers on the promoter's system.
Those ratepayers are ill-served by a two- or three-cent per kilowatt-hour
promotional sale that forecloses a four- or five-cent intersystem
transaction.
One obvious response is that higher prices on wholesale markets re-
quire long term commitments, creating additional risks for the seller's
ratepayers. Surpluses may disappear more rapidly than forecasts indicate,
rendering the initial commitment unprofitable but no less binding.
Yet many promotional commitments carry multi-year rate guarantees,
and, as indicated above, those that do not can nonetheless influence con-
sumption decisions with long term consequences. Unless a promotional
program is carefully designed to avoid extended impacts, it carries the
same risks as those associated with long term wholesale transactions. Con-
sumption that was profitable when marginal costs were low may become a
losing proposition if expensive new generating capacity is constructed, and
utilities cannot change pricing rules to avoid the loss."2
Moreover, in the case of wholesale power transfers, least-cost planning
71. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW ELECTRIC POWER TECHNOLOGIES: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 1990s 65 (1985) ("the total volume of bulk power transfers increased by a
factor of 30 between 1945 and 1980 while total electricity production increased only by a factor of
10") (citing U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., INTERUTILITY BULK POWER
TRANSACTIONS (1983)); Monongahela Power Company, No. ER87-330-000, 39 Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,350 n.29 (1987) ("Approximately thirty percent of total electricity sales
now occur in the wholesale market and are therefore subject to the [Federal Energy Regulatory]
Commission's jurisdiction").
72. Once discounts have expired, recipients revert to the status of ordinary customers and are
entitled to the average-cost rates that others pay. I am aware of no basis in the law of rate regulation
that allows for converting discounts into surcharges in order to recover costs of new capacity from
beneficiaries of promotional policies, or to test the willingness of customers to pay for such capacity.
These customers would doubtless contend that all ratepayers shared responsibility for the system-wide
demand that was prompting the capacity additions. Cf supra text accompanying note 54.
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techniques create valuable insurance against losses. Export contracts can
provide funding for developing the seller's conservation resources in ad-
vance of domestic needs, and numerous alternatives to new generators are
available for ensuring that surpluses can be sustained over the term of a
contract.7" For reasons already explored, partial reinvestment of export
revenues in domestic conservation should reduce uncertainty about future
system needs, which means that unpleasant surprises from eroding sur-
pluses will be less likely. By contrast, promotional policies tend to increase
those uncertainties.
An instructive illustration, in terms of both risk and return, emerges
from two recent sales of roughly equivalent quantities of surplus electric-
ity, both involving the same western supplier. In January 1987, the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) offered 438,000 megawatt-hours
of power for short term sale to utilities that could stimulate consumption
increases on their systems. The price averaged less than 1.5 cents per
kilowatt-hour.7 4 At least one recipient of this discounted electricity used it
to encourage permanent installations of electric heat, which the power sys-
tem will be obliged to serve for a period substantially exceeding the six-
month duration of the discount. 6
A year later, BPA negotiated a firm sale of comparable size to three
southern California cities, which will extend over twenty years in the
event that surpluses persist that long. However, BPA will build no new
generators to support the sale; it will rely instead on existing surpluses
and conservation investment." The price was 3.4 cents per kilowatt-hour
for the first year, escalating at 6% or more thereafter." The initial price
disparity between the two transactions adds up to about $2 million per
year for every 100,000 megawatt-hours of sales-and that quantity repre-
sents less than one percent of current energy surpluses in BPA's region.78
73. These alternatives include purchasing interruption rights from customers with dual-fuel capa-
bilities, temporarily reactivating underutilized fossil fuel generators, and buying spot market power. J.
Wheaton, Harvesting Conservation: Seven Trillion Mills From a Long-Term Sale of Firm Surplus
Electricity 24-27 (Natural Resources Defense Council 1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author); see also Meek, Pacific Northwest Conservation for California: The Mutual Benefits of
Long-Term Cooperation, 13 ENVTL. L. 841 (1983).
74. Bonneville Power Admin., Surplus Power Block Sale Description 1-2 (1986) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
75. See Memorandum to Richland (Wash.) City Council from Staff Re: Residential Customer
Credits for Electric Conversion (Feb. 17, 1987) (on file with author).
76. See Bonneville Power Admin., Surplus Marketing Update: Power Sales and Exchanges With
Southern California Municipal Utilities (Jan. 5, 1988) [hereinafter Surplus Marketing Update] (un-
published manuscript on file with author). The role of conservation in sustaining such transactions is
described in an earlier BPA analysis. OFFICE OF POWER & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, BONNEVILLE
POWER ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PROPOSED CONTRACT WITH SOUTHERN CALIFOR-
NIA EDISON 17 (May 1986) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT].
77. Surplus Marketing Update, supra note 76, at 3.
78. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, SURPLUS POWER IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 3
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D. Environmental Degradation
In general, when power plants are dispatched, the sequence reflects op-
erating costs: the most expensive units are shut down first. Gas and oil
units drop off a system first, followed by coal. These technologies account
for more than 70% of U.S. electrical generation, with coal representing
more than three-fourths of that total.79  Outside the hydropower-
dominated Pacific Northwest, nuclear generation is seldom, if ever, cur-
tailed for economic reasons. Hydroelectric units have the lowest operating
costs and the preferred position on any utility's dispatch order.
This means that most of the capacity that is in surplus at any given
time has relatively high operating costs and burns nonrenewable fossil
fuels that contribute significantly to global warming, acid rain, and other
air pollution problems. The utility industry accounts for two-thirds of
U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions and almost one-third of carbon dioxide re-
leases. In each case, coal-fired plants are the primary sources.80 Moreover,
some utilities' "dirtiest" coal-fired plants also have relatively high operat-
ing costs compared to other units in the same systems."1 The environmen-
tal benefits of not running such facilities should be, but seldom are, in-
cluded in any assessment of efforts to stimulate additional consumption. 2
Prospects for a harder look at these benefits are uncertain. Public utility
commissions are not generally inclined to assume environmental protection
responsibilities, and federal regulators have disclaimed any authority to
evaluate the environmental merits of interstate power marketing propos-
(1988) (projecting mean surplus of 1400 average megawatts for 1988 in BPA's Northwest service
territory).
79. Relative shares of net electrical generation were as follows for 1986: coal-56%, gas-10%,
oil-6%, nuclear-17%, hydro-12%. U.S. Energy Information Admin., MONTHLY ENERGY REV.,
Oct. 1987, at 78.
80. See Brockmann, Acid Rain: Corroding United States-Canadian Relations, 6 J. ENERGY L.
& POL'Y 357, 361 (1985) (sulfur dioxide); The Greenhouse Effect, EPRI JOURNAL, June 1986, at 13
(utilities account for 28% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, compared with 29% for all other indus-
tries combined, 27% for transportation, and 16% for homes and businesses).
81. While there is no a priori reason to assume positive correlations between operating costs and
emissions, they sometimes exist. See, e.g., Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council on the
Bonneville Power Administration's Proposed Long Term Intertie Access Policy and Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement (Jan. 15, 1987), at app. 4 (Pacific Northwest coal-fired plants with highest
sulfur dioxide emissions are also among most expensive to operate, because higher fuel costs over-
whelm savings from less stringent pollution controls); Motion to Intervene of the Natural Resources
Defense Council, Monongahela Power Co., Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. No. CP87-330-000
(1987) (arguing that expanding Ohio Edison's power production would be likely to involve increased
operations at several northern Ohio units that "are among the 'dirtiest' power plants in the nation").
82. As Section III.C. supra suggests, this does not mean that an environmental case can never be
made for increased power production at existing facilities. Long term power transfers may reduce
both buyers' and sellers' needs for new generating capacity, and temporary emissions increases in the
sellers' service territory may be more than offset by reduced emissions from the buyers' generators.
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 76, at 19-20.
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als.8 3 However, earlier discussion indicates that utilities and regulators
have ample independent grounds for adopting marketing policies that will
improve environmental quality even as they advance economic interests.
IV. Toward Responsible Power Marketing
A threshold question is whether any of this Article's arguments can be
persuasive to utilities whose net revenues continuously rise and fall in
synchrony with kilowatt-hour sales. After all, managers who cannot meet
the next year's revenue goals may not be in a position to address long
term economic or environmental considerations.
While it is extremely important to break the artificial linkage between
sales volume and profits, progress remains possible in the interim. The
next two sections identify means for avoiding many of the dangers
sketched above, even where automatic revenue adjustment mechanisms are
presently unavailable. The focus is two of the nation's largest regional
power systems, some of whose key characteristics are widely shared
among utilities elsewhere in North America.8 4 The Article closes with
proposed guidelines for responsible power marketing, which draw both on
the case studies and on the analysis that precedes them.
A. Accommodating Regulatory Concerns: A Residential Sector Model
If profits will increase automatically with increasing sales of kilowatt-
hours, it is natural to look for pricing strategies that will boost both sales
and profits. Often this involves trying to make rate structures more entic-
ing to those in a position to consume high volumes of power. Despite the
benefits to stockholders and some ratepayers from the proposed reforms,
regulatory approval is far from assured. Intervenors concerned about envi-
ronmental and least-cost planning issues are likely to appear, along with
representatives of lower volume users such as low income ratepayers.
One response is to seek ways of accommodating marketing, equity, and
long term planning objectives. An illustration appears as Appendix A,
83. See, e.g., Investigation into Transportation Rates Charged by Gas Utilities, Investigation into
Incentive Rates for Electric Service, Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order No. 87-402 (Mar. 31, 1987), at 7
(utility pricing policies may not be based on "social policy goals" independent of Commission's man-
date); Monongahela Power Company, No. ER87-330-000, 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep.
(CCH) 61,350 (1987) ("Congress has not granted the Commission authority to reject rate filings on
environmental grounds.").
84. The first case study is taken from the Pacific Northwest, a winter-peaking, hydropower domi-
nated system with substantial surpluses of coal-fired generating capacity. The second case study cen-
ters on California, a summer-peaking system that relies relatively heavily on gas- and oil-fired units,
supplemented by nuclear power plants. Northwest utilities tend to be sellers in interstate power mar-
kets, while California utilities tend to be buyers. The California illustration involves electricity sales to
which ERAM does not apply.
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which is an agreement filed with the Montana Public Service Commission
by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), an environmental
organization, and the Pacific Power & Light Company, the Pacific North-
west's largest investor-owned utility.
The agreement calls for NRDC to withdraw its objections to the intro-
duction of declining block rates for Pacific's residential ratepayers. In re-
turn, Pacific agrees to undertake a least-cost planning process and an Ac-
tion Plan, which are designed to ensure that "[b]efore it invests in new
generating facilities, Pacific will exploit all practicable and cost-effective
conservation alternatives that offer equivalent or better system reliability."
The immediate emphasis is on preventing " 'lost opportunities' for includ-
ing cost-effective efficiency improvements in long-lived end uses of
electricity."
The Action Plan includes programs for encouraging efficiency improve-
ments in all major long-lived residential power uses, including building
shells, refrigerators, freezers, water heaters, and heat pumps. Special pro-
vision is made for low income ratepayers, whose participation in
"weatherization" programs must be at least proportional to their numbers
in the general population.85
Appendix A is a useful review of the numerous ways in which utilities
can invest effectively in residential conservation resources. Through a
combination of aggressive marketing, flexible cash incentives, and legisla-
tive advocacy, Pacific will work to ensure that long-lived uses of its prod-
uct become significantly more efficient. These investments represent
neither charity nor social engineering; they constitute a utility's purchases
of inexpensive power resources. Electricity that would have been absorbed
for decades by inefficient buildings and appliances, absent Pacific's inter-
vention, will now be available to meet the needs of new families and
businesses.
While surpluses persist, Pacific will focus its acquisitions in the cate-
gory of what otherwise would be lost conservation opportunities. If these
initiatives succeed, near term consumption increases in response to the
new rates will be dominated by behavioral changes and other reversible
actions (higher thermostat settings and reduced wood use, for example) as
opposed to investments with protracted consequences for the utility sys-
tem. Higher net revenues from the temporarily increased consumption
will finance the long term conservation investments.8"
85. Such programs install improved insulation and glazing in houses and apartments. The agree-
ment recognizes, in item 3, that achieving this goal will require full funding of conservation measures
installed in low income households.
86. Another alternative would be to amortize these payments over a period of years by incorporat-
ing them in Pacific's rate base. However, the company seeks, at least temporarily, to prevent either
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Pacific also pledges to revise its new rate structure should it determine
"that, within three years, there is a substantial possibility that . . . the
Company will have to invest in new generating capacity or power
purchase contracts with costs exceeding system average costs." In that
event, price signals will be changed to reflect the possible need for higher
cost resources.
On December 8, 1987, the Montana Public Service Commission ap-
proved the agreement and granted Pacific's request for declining block
rates."7 Other regional regulators have praised the agreement as "path-
breaking" and "an extremely encouraging precedent for the entire Pacific
Northwest region, and indeed for the nation. '"88
B. Reducing the Costs of Rate Discounts: An Industrial Sector Model
With increasing frequency, large industrial customers are threatening
to abandon their electric utilities in favor of self-generation or alternative
fuel suppliers." Other industries, on the verge of expanding or relocating
plants, are attracting the attention of utilities with capacity surpluses.
These competitive stimuli typically elicit offers of rate discounts, on the
theory that the system is better off with a less lucrative sale than with no
sale at all. If the customers go elsewhere, other ratepayers will have to
shoulder an increased share of the system's fixed costs.
Appendix B reprints an NRDC proposal to the California Public Utili-
ties Commission, which has been considering guidelines for the use of in-
dustrial rate discounts.9" NRDC points out that where discounts are ap-
propriate" they can be delivered either by cutting industries' electric rates
or by improving their production efficiencies. Like other customers, indus-
tries' interests lie in lower bills for energy services, as opposed to lower
rates per kilowatt-hour. Utilities that offer rate discounts should be will-
conservation payments or resource investments of any other kind from putting upward pressure on its
rates in this fashion. Of course, such an orientation is hostile to new capital commitments of all types,
not simply those in the conservation category. Pacific is willing to change its rate policies in advance of
any decisions to acquire new generators, however. See Item 6 of Appendix A.
87. Montana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, The Application of Pacific Power and Light Co. for Authority
to Adopt New Rates and Charges, Order No. 5311, Nos. 86.12.76, 86.11.61/ 86.11.62 (14) (Dec. 8,
1987).
88. Resolution of the Northwest Power Planning Council (representing Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
and Washington), adopted in Helena, Montana on Oct. 14, 1987 (on file with author).
89. See supra note 27.
90. As indicated supra at note 34, California's ERAM mechanism does not apply to industrial
sales.
91. For example, it is at least doubtful that industrial customers who routinely reject relatively
lucrative conservation investments would indeed leap at the opportunity to install and maintain their
own generating equipment, absent lucrative long term power purchase guarantees. See supra text
accompanying notes 41-45, and sources cited therein. The threat to self-generate is, of course, a
rational and effective bargaining tactic.
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ing also to offer the same customers conservation payments of comparable
present value. 2 Utilities should not resist testing whether they can hold
customers more cheaply with conservation payments than with rate dis-
counts; their own stockholders would be among the beneficiaries. Regula-
tors in both California and Connecticut found such arguments persuasive
in recent decisions that directed utilities to make industrial efficiency in-
vestments prominent parts of their competitive arsenals.9" In the Pacific
Northwest, BPA has offered to spend $76 million at Northwest aluminum
plants in order to make the industry more competitive, "bolster BPA reve-
nues . . . and relieve pressure on the rates that other BPA customers
pay."9  This program proceeds from the assumption that utility-financed
conservation measures will leave companies "in a better position to survive
economic downturns and operate at higher levels of plant capacity." '95
Appendix B also outlines ways to avoid adverse long term effects from
demand recruited through rate discount contracts. Customers would agree,
as a contractual term, to one of two conditions. Either they would ulti-
mately place part of their current loads on interruptible schedules," in
proportion to the reduction in their bill resulting from the rate concession,
or they would agree to install equivalent efficiency improvements or self-
generation equipment on schedules agreeable to the utility. By explicitly
withdrawing the utility's obligation to remain in readiness to meet these
loads, such provisions would ensure that the utility system did not add
costly new capacity to serve consumers that can only afford to buy when
capacity is inexpensive.
Comparable proposals are surfacing on other systems. Detroit Edison
recently conditioned a major industrial discount on interruption of service
92. To make the utility indifferent between the two options, the calculation of the conservation
payment would have to incorporate lost revenues from the recipient's reduced consumption, un-
less-as is perfectly plausible-the recipient were willing to commit to near term production increases
in the aftermath of efficiency improvements at its plant.
93. See Rulemaking Proceeding on Comm'n's Own Motion to Revise Electric Utility Rulemaking
Mechanisms, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Decision 88-03-008, at 48 (Mar. 9, 1988) ("It is reasonable to
require utilities to present customers with a menu of conservation options" as alternatives to rate
discounts); Application of the Conn. Light & Power Co. to Amend its Rate Schedules, Conn. Dep't of
Pub. Utilities, No. 87-07-01, at 111-14 (1988) ("[Conservation and load management] will be a valua-
ble marketing tool to retain customers who might otherwise be lost to self-generation and to promote
general customer satisfaction as the Company addresses the competitive challenge in electricity
markets").
94. Bonneville Power Admin., Department of Energy Information 1 (press release Mar. 9, 1987).
95. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., ALUMINUM SMELTER CONSERVATION/MODERNIZATION
PROPOSAL 3 (May 1986).
96. Service to interruptible customers can be suspended if electricity supplies tighten, and utilities
need not plan the addition of resources to serve interruptible loads. BATTELLE PAC. NORTHWEST
LABORATORIES, THE DIRECT SERVICE INDUSTRIES: THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE NORTHWEST
POWER SYSTEM AND ECONOMY vii-viii (1983) (value of interruptible customers as "forced outage
reserves, generating plant and conservation delay reserves as well as stability reserves").
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when marginal power costs increase. 97 BPA has decided to revise its mar-
keting programs to "strengthen provisions to ensure consistency with goals
of maximum energy efficiency and minimum long term resource develop-
ment. ' '.. Specifically, "[iun exchange for [contracts guaranteeing] rate sta-
bility, BPA would require: (1) initial state-of-the-art energy efficiency; (2)
future load reduction through efficiency improvement; (3) partial inter-
ruptibility after advance notification of impending load/resource deficits;
or (4) some other operating characteristics which benefit the [power]
system." 99
Such provisions have already been incorporated in the BPA efficiency
program for aluminum smelters described above; the industries' long term
contractual entitlements to power have been reduced by an amount corre-
sponding to the anticipated contribution of their utility-financed con-
servation.' 00
C. Guidelines
These case studies and the earlier discussion suggest a five-part test for
utilities' power marketing programs, which could be applied in either in-
ternal or regulatory forums:
1. Would the program exacerbate market barriers to long-lived con-
servation measures with "lost opportunity" characteristics? If so, has
the utility adopted programs to minimize irreversible losses of this
kind?
2. Would the program increase uncertainty about future electricity
needs by introducing substantial amounts of highly price-sensitive
consumption? If so, have steps been taken (through contractual com-
mitments such as those described in Appendix B, for example) to
insulate the system from costs associated with such uncertainty?
3. To the extent that rate discounts feature in the program, does the
utility offer efficiency incentives as an alternative way of retaining
the same customers' business?
4. Might the program preempt more lucrative wholesale power sales
opportunities?
5. In conjunction with the marketing program, has the utility devel-
oped and maintained the capacity to elicit efficiency improvements
97. Ponczak, Michigan Automaker to Save 2 0,c30% on Discount Electric Rate, ENERGY USER
NEWS, Sept. 7, 1987, at 1, col. 1 ("In return for the lower rate, the utility is given the right to
interrupt service whenever its marginal cost of production rises above 4 cents per kilowatt-hour.").
98. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., supra note 30, at iii, 10.
99. Id.
100. See Bonneville Power Admin., supra note 95, at 14.
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from all major categories of electricity use in preparation for ulti-
mate exhaustion of current surpluses?
Managers would find it easier to embrace these guidelines if their com-
panies' net revenues were shielded from downward fluctuations in
kilowatt-hour sales; some variant of California's ERAM remains an im-
portant inducement to responsible power marketing. But nothing in the
guidelines would require utilities to shed their competitive orientation in a
volatile and changing energy marketplace.
Conclusion
As a strategy for winning and holding customers, permanently lower
bills are likely to be more effective than temporarily lower rates. The most
reliable way to keep customers' bills and rates down is to ensure that their
power systems can postpone costly new generators as long as possible.
And the best course for meeting that objective without jeopardizing utili-
ties' service obligations is to prevent market barriers from obstructing effi-
ciency improvements that save power more cheaply than it can be gen-
erated.
None of these objectives are served by marketing strategies designed
simply to increase electricity consumption and make fuller use of existing
generating capacity. Conservation investments remain a more promising
route to competitive success for an industry that can never forget the fate
of Samuel Insull.
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Appendix A"'1
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
In the Matter of the Application of PA- )
CIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) UTILITY DIVISION
for Authority to Adopt New Rates and ) Docket No. 86.12.76
Charges for Electric Service Furnished in )
the State of Montana )
STIPULATION OF PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
AND THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
INTRODUCTION
This is a Stipulation between Pacific Power & Light Company (Pacific
or the Company) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
which is intended to resolve, as between Pacific and the NRDC, all con-
tested issues in this proceeding.
As a result of this Stipulation, the NRDC withdraws its objections to
the residential rate design proposed by Pacific in this proceeding. The
NRDC understands and agrees that Pacific's performance of its obliga-
tions under this Stipulation is conditioned upon the Montana Public Ser-
vice Commission's (Commission's) substantial approval of the rate spread
and rate design proposed by Pacific. If the Commission declines to sub-
stantially approve Pacific's proposed rate spread and rate design, this
Stipulation shall have no further force and effect.
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES:
A. Before it invests in new generating facilities, Pacific will exploit
all practicable and cost-effective conservation alternatives that offer equiv-
alent or better system reliability.
B. Given pervasive and durable market barriers, electricity price
signals provided to customers in utility rates will not capture all conserva-
tion that is cost-effective from a utility's perspective.
C. Pacific's power marketing programs should be designed to pre-
vent what the Northwest Power Planning Council has termed "lost op-
101. Although in most respects self-explanatory, the Stipulation includes a few references that
require brief definition. The "Model Conservation Standards" of Item I are the Northwest Power
Planning Council's efficiency standards for new residential buildings, which are designed to reduce
space-heating electricity needs by more than 50% compared with typical current practice. The "Ore-
gon ZIP Weatherization Program" of Item 2 offers zero interest loans to Pacific customers who im-
prove the thermal integrity of older homes. Item 5 cites a "Hasslefree Guarantee" program that
promotes the purchase of electric water heaters.
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portunities" for including cost-effective efficiency improvements in long-
lived end uses of electricity.
D. Flexibility in rate design to effectively compete is appropriate
and necessary in an era of electricity surpluses and competition, provided
that care is taken to avoid irreversible losses of cost-effective conservation
opportunities. If such losses have been minimized, regulatory support for
pricing innovation should be provided.
E. The principles embodied in A through D above are integral
components of a least-cost planning process.
ACTION PLAN
1. MODEL CONSERVATION STANDARDS: Pacific will announce its
adoption of MCS energy savings and air quality levels as the minimum
levels on all programs for new home construction. By November 1, 1987,
Pacific will develop a strategy designed to induce the marketplace to want,
accept, and ask for energy efficient homes which individually comply with
the MCS. The program may initially include incentives other than cash
payments, but Pacific is committed to designing a program to meet the
Council's goal of achieving 85 percent of MCS savings in new residential
construction by the close of 1989. If alternatives to cash payments provide
insufficient progress toward that goal, then no later than January 1, 1990,
Pacific will introduce cash payments at least equivalent to those being
offered by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) in July of 1987
under its Super Good Cents Program. Progress will be deemed insuffi-
cient unless the average penetration rate for Pacific's program at least
matches that recorded for BPA's Super Good Cents Program for 1988. If
that level is not achieved, the required level will become 110 percent of
the Super Good Cents 1989 achievement level.
2. OREGON ZIP WEATHERIZATION PROGRAM: Pacific will seek to
revise its Oregon ZIP weatherization program tariffs to test requirements
that 1) recipients of weatherization funding install all cost-effective and
structurally feasible measures at the same time, and that 2) the following
minimum weatherization levels be utilized where structurally feasible:
a. Glazing-triple glazing, for single-pane windows (double glass
windows will not be retrofitted);
b. Wall insulation-R-11, for houses without wall insulation in-
stalled;
c. Ceiling insulation-R-38, for houses with less than R-30 in place
(R-30 or better attics will not be retrofitted);
d. Floor insulation-R-30, for houses with less than R-19 in place,
unless a wooden superstructure would be needed to hold the insula-
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tion in place, in which case R- 19 is the target (R- 19 or better floors
will not be retrofitted).
Pacific will also work on a best efforts basis to get such standards and
requirements incorporated in joint projects with other agencies for low
income weatherization.
3. Low INCOME WEATHERIZATION PROGRAMS: The Company's
goal is to achieve at least proportional participation by low income cus-
tomers for current and future weatherization programs. The Company
will continuously monitor its progress and publish annual reports docu-
menting the results. The Company acknowledges that the way to achieve
proportional participation is to construct programs which, with all fund-
ing sources considered, provide full funding of weatherization to the par-
ticipant. Therefore, in Montana, Pacific will begin a program this year
which will couple Pacific's funds with other agencies' available funds to
achieve proportional penetration for low income customers. Pacific's dollar
commitment to this program will be $100,000.
4. APPLIANCE EFFICIENCY STANDARDS: Pacific has consistently
supported legislation to raise appliance efficiencies to levels that are cost-
effective as resources; such standards will remain one of the Company's
major legislative priorities. Recognizing, however, that such standards are
unlikely to take effect before the early 1990's, and that the standards
could fall short of those that are cost-effective for the Region, the follow-
ing activities will be undertaken:
a. Pacific will support BPA's "Energy Efficiency Award" program for
refrigerators and freezers, throughout Pacific's service territory in
the Northwest Region.
b. Pacific will take the lead in initiating a market research and dem-
onstration effort to develop a cost-effective incentive program for
encouraging purchase of high-efficiency appliances. The program
will be designed to rigorously test rebate and other promotional
programs for highly efficient models in at least the following long-
lived product categories: refrigerators, freezers and heat pumps.
The tests will be designed by a Research Advisory Group (RAG)
with representatives from Pacific, the Northwest Power Planning
Council, BPA and the NRDC. The RAG will consult with repre-
sentatives of the American Council for an Energy Efficient Econ-
omy (ACEEE), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the
Northwest Conservation Act Coalition (NCAC), state regulatory
commissions, the appliance industry and other appropriate groups
as needed. The RAG will function by consensus and will meet to
begin work on this project at least twelve weeks before the pro-
posed effective date of any new Oregon rate schedules. After receiv-
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ing approval for implementation of the Company's proposed resi-
dential rate design in Montana and Oregon, Pacific will provide up
to $500,000 per each of the two succeeding fifteen month periods to
complete the design and research. Additional funding of $350,000
per each of the same two fifteen month periods will be made avail-
able upon approval for implementation of the Company's proposed
residential rate design in Washington. For purposes of this subsec-
tion, "approval for implementation" means regulatory action that
permits substantial achievement of Pacific's rate design objectives.
5. ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN PACIFIC'S MARKETING PROGRAMS: All
Pacific's future appliance/equipment programs will promote efficient
units subject to reasonable availability. For heat pumps, Pacific will adopt
an initial standard of 6.8 HSPF. For water heaters, the initial standard is
the 1990 Federal standard. Until the energy factor is normally displayed
on water heaters, it may be necessary to express the standard using insu-
lation values. By a date six months from the date of the order in this
proceeding, Pacific will review and modify if necessary, as agreed to in
negotiations with the NRDC, the efficiency standards for both heat pump
and water heater programs to reflect an inquiry conducted in consultation
with the RAG, the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-
Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), the Edison Electric Institute (EEI)
and other appropriate groups. The inquiry will address the feasibility of
upgrading the initial standards at the close of the six-month period, taking
into account
(1) that the purpose of Pacific's marketing programs is to maintain
market share;
(2) cost-effectiveness of the additional savings from an upgraded
standard;
(3) the tradeoffs from the customer's perspective of increased net
capital costs versus operating costs;
(4) availability and reliability of models in the relevant size
categories;
(5) availability of brands carried by dealers in Pacific's service
territory;
(6) the appropriateness and timing of further improvements in the
standard over time;
(7) likely impacts of the programs themselves on current market
conditions;
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(8) the impact of varying balance points for heat pumps on effi-
ciency and customer cost tradeoffs;
(9) the acceptability and credibility with Pacific's trade allies neces-
sary to make a program effective;
(10) the suitability of the resulting standard to communication
through mass media techniques;
(11) timing of standard introduction to allow dealers opportunity to
update inventory at their major reorder point;
(12) minimization of adverse reaction in the market;
(13) that the standard needs to be easy to understand and explain;
and
(14) the possible need to adopt a standard that differentiates between
rural and urban markets, and between units of different sizes.
If in the future Pacific develops programs promoting other appli-
ances, such as refrigerators and freezers, efficiency standards will be
adopted in consultation with the NRDC and other appropriate groups at
that time, prior to program implementation. Pacific will review standards
every two years and revise them appropriately to reflect changes in availa-
bility of energy efficient appliances and other relevant criteria.
No further promotion of Pacific's "HassleFree Guarantee" water
heater program will be made anywhere in Pacific's service territory until
the initial efficiency standard is incorporated. Materials which direct cus-
tomers to choose efficient water heaters will be incorporated into the ex-
isting program. Oregon participants in the existing program will be in-
structed that Pacific's reimbursement payment is conditioned upon proof
that replacement water heaters comply with Oregon code requirements.
All new promotions will incorporate the then-current standards (including
any improvement in initial standards).
6. RATE DESIGN EVALUATION TRIGGER: Wherever declining
block rates are adopted in its service territory, Pacific will provide notices
to its customers that the rates are a reflection of conditions that are subject
to change, and that it may be necessary in the future to charge higher
prices for increased consumption. Such notices shall be inserted in residen-
tial customers' bills with each rate change, and shall be repeated at least
every two years. Under either of the following circumstances, Pacific will
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request an upward adjustment or elimination of declining block rates
through its system:
a. Pacific is buying power under BPA's New Resources Rate to meet
its retail load requirements, and BPA acquires an option for a new
resource(s) whose projected cost per kilowatt-hour would exceed
both the current New Resources Rate and Pacific's tailblock rates.
b. Pacific determines that, within three years, there is a substantial
possibility that to meet its retail load requirements the Company
will have to invest in new generating capacity or power purchase
contracts with costs exceeding system average costs.
DATED this 22nd day of August, 1987.
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Appendix B
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Rulemaking Proceeding on the Commission's )
Own Motion to Revise Electric Utility ) I. 86-10-001
Ratemaking Mechanisms in Response to )
Changing Conditions in the Electric Industry ) Dated: July 26, 1987
OUTLINE OF NRDC'S PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR SPECIAL
CONTRACTS
This summary assumes, without conceding, that utilities must offer
concessions to some large commercial and industrial customers to prevent
uneconomic bypasses of the utilities' systems. The purpose of such conces-
sions is to lessen the attraction of self-generation by reducing customers'
bills; for some reason, utilities have focused almost exclusively on rate
strategies for this purpose. Yet bills can also be reduced by increasing the
efficiency of customers' electricity consumption: "Long-range conservation
continues to be an important goal, and conservation can be an effective
tool in limiting bypass." Decision 87-05-071, Finding of Fact #12, at 23
(5/29/87).
DISADVANTAGES OF SOLE RELIANCE ON RATE REDUC-
TION OPTIONS:
1. Increased volatility of system loads, and consequent increases in plan-
ning uncertainty (lower rates encourage lesser operational and process
efficiencies, reducing customers' ability to absorb future rate increases
and reducing their national/international competitiveness over the
long run);
2. Possibility that what begins as a "temporary" rate concession cannot
be withdrawn when contract term expires (customers acclimated to
lower rates will use political leverage to sustain them);
3. Preemption of long-lived process efficiency improvements that are
cost-effective alternatives to fossil fuel combustion at utility generators
and/or new capacity additions (incentives to make long-lived effi-
ciency investments are damaged by reduced rewards and increased
uncertainties associated with availability of rate-concession contracts).
A REMEDY: PROPOSED GUIDELINES
1. Customers who are offered a rate concession must also be offered, as
an alternative, a conservation payment of equivalent present value.
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Customers who elect conservation payments will continue paying cur-
rent rates.
2. Regardless of whether customers elect rate concessions or conservation
payments, they must agree to one of the following contingencies upon
termination of their special contracts:
a. Shift of specified fraction of customers' current load (at outset of
special contract) to interruptible status (not less than the percent-
age reduction in the customer's bill represented by the rate con-
cession or conservation payment); or
b. installation of self-generation equipment, upon the utility's re-
quest, that reduces the customers' load by a specified fraction
(again, not less than the percentage reduction in the customer's
bill represented by the rate concession or conservation payment).
